
Mira Kaneva
I am Assistant Professor at the Department of International Law and International Relations (Faculty of Law) at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski". I joined academia in 2010, having first worked as a teaching assistant and PhD student. I hold a PhD in International Law and International Relations (the thesis being on soft power), and my research focuses on international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy, security studies, international law and ethics. I am currently conducting research in border studies.
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Papers
The chapter focuses on devolutionary processes such as deepening autonomy and enlarging transfer ... more The chapter focuses on devolutionary processes such as deepening autonomy and enlarging transfer of power to different levels. Though till recently viewed as a deviation, devolution in territoriality constitutes a new normality in the networks of interdependence that sustain European integration, with the latest example of Brexit. The chapter seeks for the practical and moral ‘red lines’ to devolution in the European context. It finds them in the extremist nationalistic rhetoric about regaining control and the defense of sovereignty. These speech acts stir insecurity for they rely heavily on calls for emergency and mobilization against enemies. The author argues that the revolutionizing ambitions about the reconfiguration of the European territorial and legal unity are futile because, practically speaking, they confront simple hackneyed solutions with the social complexity. From an ethical viewpoint, they advance the moral geography of othering and exclusion – something completely incompatible with the European values of solidarity.
The EU beyond 2020: in Search of Identity, Sustainability and Growth: Collection of the reports of a scientific conference organized by Bulgarian European Studies Association, held in Sofia on 26 October 2017, 2017
EU security crisis is a reflection of its identity crisis . There are two types of processes that... more EU security crisis is a reflection of its identity crisis . There are two types of processes that affect the Union's stability as a security community (after K. Deutsch) - the first one is the diffusion of insecurities that are more or less perceptible and thus more painful (terrorism, extremism, migration crisis, debt crisis), the other one is more subjective and intangible (any transition or transformation in public perceptions like populism or Euroscepticism).
Law and Borders (A compilation of conference papers), 2018
Ever perpetuating crises in the European Union have precipitated the challenges to sovereignty. B... more Ever perpetuating crises in the European Union have precipitated the challenges to sovereignty. Being neither a monolithic, nor a static concept, sovereignty emerges as a specific boundary term for the role of the state and the rule of law. Recent developments, such as the Catalan referendum for independence, have delegitimized sovereignty's dual function – that of the demarcation of the territory where supreme authority is exercised, and, that of the safeguarding of common identity.
Diplomacy, 2018
In 2017, the ”tectonic” activity within the framework of the world power-centered configuration w... more In 2017, the ”tectonic” activity within the framework of the world power-centered configuration was most strongly felt in the disconcerted power center of the European Union as it was in this center that the intricate interaction in the global system was causing the deepest cracks. Described as non-impervious and “elastic” in nature (with diverging concentric circles of action), the EU has been losing a great deal of its gravitation and running the risk of being left to flow weightless in the epoch of diffuse ”evil”.
Which are the threats to the integrity of the EU that have been menacing its structural, institutional and legal concurrence – more often than not, as a single whole?
In the first place, this is the financial crisis which has been described as a chronic state of dysfunction of the credit institutions and the banking system as a whole, the divergences in competitiveness, the inertia rather than a drive towards an overall growth, and the over-indebtedness which was symptomatic at an early stage of the presence of “free riders” in the Eurozone that have been discrediting the idea of burden sharing.
Secondly, this is the migration wave that has been intensifying the general concern about the need for solidarity in terms of humanitarian support within the framework of the integration community without being able to prescribe any shared views and, hence – joint action. In addition, the refugee-and-migration crisis has been having some side effects that have been causing disaccord on a government level thus depreciating the sui generis nature of the European Union incorporating state and non-state characteristics. There has been an adverse reaction stemming from the previous risk which involves paranoid episodes of xenophobia materializing in all kinds of outrage against the Different. This intolerance has been further complicated by the terrorist attacks in some large European cities which have further revealed the vulnerability of the integration community to the unconventional risks.
Populism is an intersection of these pathological deviations occurring in the condition of the European Union as it employs an austerity discourse (budget cutting), radicalism (Islamophobia and homophobia) and exceptionalism (independence and self-sufficiency).
In view of the above mentioned threats, how could one impose the emergency measures that are needed for the preservation of the existential values (second generation securitization ) as stipulated by the Copenhagen school? One universal measure involves restriction which, however, is going to affect the structural, the institutional and the legal stability of the integration community. In the first place, it involves budget constraints that are going to affect the banking institutions, the financial assets, and the feeling of wealth. Secondly, this measure is going to affect the sovereignty which stands for independence and disobedience to higher authority, meaning distinctness again. And thirdly, it is going to exclude the Other by putting up barriers and fences in order to of ward off all kinds of differences on all possible levels.
How has the European Union been responding to these threats – firmly, by consolidating its position (the strategy of entrenchment) or meekly, by adaptation? The preservation of the ”soft” approach that has existed thus far is a priority of the multilateral strategy in relation to the traditional power poles within the conventional problem areas. However, the intricate interweaving of domestic and foreign security aspects that tend to blur its outlines in the context of the diffuse threats mentioned above call for a much harder approach.
The thesis of this piece of research is supposed to link the above mentioned threats with a meta-threat that has been trivialized or, to put it differently, turned into normality – meaning populism.
The conceptual framework requires a reassessment of the situation: because although it might look at first sight that the European Union has lost some of its soft power (in its relation to the acquis) as a result of the Brexit referendum, it is the centrifugal populist trends that tend to encourage the consolidation of the community – both internally and externally.
The research methodology has been based on Walter Carlsnaes’ model which takes into consideration the interaction between the structure (as a purely power center category) and subjectivity. When examining the elections held and the Brexit referendum, we have taken into account the rational and the cognitive prerequisites, including the ones expanded by emotional and value premises; we have also taken into consideration the situational and the structural variables (the role of the individual Member States and of the community as a whole), as well as the institutional factors that tend to generate the environment for the above mentioned crisis processes.
The empirical section was built around the challenges facing the British national sovereignty as a result of the Brexit referendum which reflects, as if in a curved mirror, the penal vote for reasons of deficit of democracy in the EU (excessive bureaucracy), as well as the immigration threat – the decay of the imperial idea of the exceptionality of the UK with an attempted, but not so efficient, isolation from the global challenges. Next comes the chronological analysis of the 2017 processes involving the change of power in seven European states which, quite in harmony with the populists’ claims that they are going to overturn the order existing within the domestic political elites and in the European institutions, managed to establish a dynamic status quo that has been maintained by the inertia – in some transition countries, and by consistency – in the countries with well-established institutional culture.
Which are the threats to the integrity of the EU that have been menacing its structural, institutional and legal concurrence – more often than not, as a single whole?
In the first place, this is the financial crisis which has been described as a chronic state of dysfunction of the credit institutions and the banking system as a whole, the divergences in competitiveness, the inertia rather than a drive towards an overall growth, and the over-indebtedness which was symptomatic at an early stage of the presence of “free riders” in the Eurozone that have been discrediting the idea of burden sharing.
Secondly, this is the migration wave that has been intensifying the general concern about the need for solidarity in terms of humanitarian support within the framework of the integration community without being able to prescribe any shared views and, hence – joint action. In addition, the refugee-and-migration crisis has been having some side effects that have been causing disaccord on a government level thus depreciating the sui generis nature of the European Union incorporating state and non-state characteristics. There has been an adverse reaction stemming from the previous risk which involves paranoid episodes of xenophobia materializing in all kinds of outrage against the Different. This intolerance has been further complicated by the terrorist attacks in some large European cities which have further revealed the vulnerability of the integration community to the unconventional risks.
Populism is an intersection of these pathological deviations occurring in the condition of the European Union as it employs an austerity discourse (budget cutting), radicalism (Islamophobia and homophobia) and exceptionalism (independence and self-sufficiency).
In view of the above mentioned threats, how could one impose the emergency measures that are needed for the preservation of the existential values (second generation securitization ) as stipulated by the Copenhagen school? One universal measure involves restriction which, however, is going to affect the structural, the institutional and the legal stability of the integration community. In the first place, it involves budget constraints that are going to affect the banking institutions, the financial assets, and the feeling of wealth. Secondly, this measure is going to affect the sovereignty which stands for independence and disobedience to higher authority, meaning distinctness again. And thirdly, it is going to exclude the Other by putting up barriers and fences in order to of ward off all kinds of differences on all possible levels.
How has the European Union been responding to these threats – firmly, by consolidating its position (the strategy of entrenchment) or meekly, by adaptation? The preservation of the ”soft” approach that has existed thus far is a priority of the multilateral strategy in relation to the traditional power poles within the conventional problem areas. However, the intricate interweaving of domestic and foreign security aspects that tend to blur its outlines in the context of the diffuse threats mentioned above call for a much harder approach.
The thesis of this piece of research is supposed to link the above mentioned threats with a meta-threat that has been trivialized or, to put it differently, turned into normality – meaning populism.
The conceptual framework requires a reassessment of the situation: because although it might look at first sight that the European Union has lost some of its soft power (in its relation to the acquis) as a result of the Brexit referendum, it is the centrifugal populist trends that tend to encourage the consolidation of the community – both internally and externally.
The research methodology has been based on Walter Carlsnaes’ model which takes into consideration the interaction between the structure (as a purely power center category) and subjectivity. When examining the elections held and the Brexit referendum, we have taken into account the rational and the cognitive prerequisites, including the ones expanded by emotional and value premises; we have also taken into consideration the situational and the structural variables (the role of the individual Member States and of the community as a whole), as well as the institutional factors that tend to generate the environment for the above mentioned crisis processes.
The empirical section was built around the challenges facing the British national sovereignty as a result of the Brexit referendum which reflects, as if in a curved mirror, the penal vote for reasons of deficit of democracy in the EU (excessive bureaucracy), as well as the immigration threat – the decay of the imperial idea of the exceptionality of the UK with an attempted, but not so efficient, isolation from the global challenges. Next comes the chronological analysis of the 2017 processes involving the change of power in seven European states which, quite in harmony with the populists’ claims that they are going to overturn the order existing within the domestic political elites and in the European institutions, managed to establish a dynamic status quo that has been maintained by the inertia – in some transition countries, and by consistency – in the countries with well-established institutional culture.
BELOV, M. (ed.). Rule of Law at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century. Eleven International Publishing. The Hague, 2018
The paper takes the vantage point of the English school as a major international relations theory... more The paper takes the vantage point of the English school as a major international relations theory and acknowledges the importance of law and morality besides the institutionalized role of the balance of power in international politics. Rule of law nowadays proves to be one of the founding principles that maintain order in international society. The question of its universality presupposes the inclusion of compliant states and the expansion of a community based on democracy, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, checks and balances, constitutional review, respect for human rights. Thus specific ethical (rule-of-law based) boundaries are drawn in accordance with EU normative power of principles, standards and values, both in the Union's internal and external affairs: (1) between the EU and several Central European states that diverge from basic rule-of-law principles and are therefore prone to moral exclusionary practices; (2) between the EU and some Western Balkans countries whose efforts to meet accession criteria are faltering; (3) between the EU and ex-Soviet states that oscillate back from the EU perspective due to the complex ties with other powerful states.
The chapter focuses on devolutionary processes such as deepening autonomy and enlarging transfer ... more The chapter focuses on devolutionary processes such as deepening autonomy and enlarging transfer of power to different levels. Though till recently viewed as a deviation, devolution in territoriality constitutes a new normality in the networks of interdependence that sustain European integration, with the latest example of Brexit. The chapter seeks for the practical and moral ‘red lines’ to devolution in the European context. It finds them in the extremist nationalistic rhetoric about regaining control and the defense of sovereignty. These speech acts stir insecurity for they rely heavily on calls for emergency and mobilization against enemies. The author argues that the revolutionizing ambitions about the reconfiguration of the European territorial and legal unity are futile because, practically speaking, they confront simple hackneyed solutions with the social complexity. From an ethical viewpoint, they advance the moral geography of othering and exclusion – something completely incompatible with the European values of solidarity.
The EU beyond 2020: in Search of Identity, Sustainability and Growth: Collection of the reports of a scientific conference organized by Bulgarian European Studies Association, held in Sofia on 26 October 2017, 2017
EU security crisis is a reflection of its identity crisis . There are two types of processes that... more EU security crisis is a reflection of its identity crisis . There are two types of processes that affect the Union's stability as a security community (after K. Deutsch) - the first one is the diffusion of insecurities that are more or less perceptible and thus more painful (terrorism, extremism, migration crisis, debt crisis), the other one is more subjective and intangible (any transition or transformation in public perceptions like populism or Euroscepticism).
Law and Borders (A compilation of conference papers), 2018
Ever perpetuating crises in the European Union have precipitated the challenges to sovereignty. B... more Ever perpetuating crises in the European Union have precipitated the challenges to sovereignty. Being neither a monolithic, nor a static concept, sovereignty emerges as a specific boundary term for the role of the state and the rule of law. Recent developments, such as the Catalan referendum for independence, have delegitimized sovereignty's dual function – that of the demarcation of the territory where supreme authority is exercised, and, that of the safeguarding of common identity.
Diplomacy, 2018
In 2017, the ”tectonic” activity within the framework of the world power-centered configuration w... more In 2017, the ”tectonic” activity within the framework of the world power-centered configuration was most strongly felt in the disconcerted power center of the European Union as it was in this center that the intricate interaction in the global system was causing the deepest cracks. Described as non-impervious and “elastic” in nature (with diverging concentric circles of action), the EU has been losing a great deal of its gravitation and running the risk of being left to flow weightless in the epoch of diffuse ”evil”.
Which are the threats to the integrity of the EU that have been menacing its structural, institutional and legal concurrence – more often than not, as a single whole?
In the first place, this is the financial crisis which has been described as a chronic state of dysfunction of the credit institutions and the banking system as a whole, the divergences in competitiveness, the inertia rather than a drive towards an overall growth, and the over-indebtedness which was symptomatic at an early stage of the presence of “free riders” in the Eurozone that have been discrediting the idea of burden sharing.
Secondly, this is the migration wave that has been intensifying the general concern about the need for solidarity in terms of humanitarian support within the framework of the integration community without being able to prescribe any shared views and, hence – joint action. In addition, the refugee-and-migration crisis has been having some side effects that have been causing disaccord on a government level thus depreciating the sui generis nature of the European Union incorporating state and non-state characteristics. There has been an adverse reaction stemming from the previous risk which involves paranoid episodes of xenophobia materializing in all kinds of outrage against the Different. This intolerance has been further complicated by the terrorist attacks in some large European cities which have further revealed the vulnerability of the integration community to the unconventional risks.
Populism is an intersection of these pathological deviations occurring in the condition of the European Union as it employs an austerity discourse (budget cutting), radicalism (Islamophobia and homophobia) and exceptionalism (independence and self-sufficiency).
In view of the above mentioned threats, how could one impose the emergency measures that are needed for the preservation of the existential values (second generation securitization ) as stipulated by the Copenhagen school? One universal measure involves restriction which, however, is going to affect the structural, the institutional and the legal stability of the integration community. In the first place, it involves budget constraints that are going to affect the banking institutions, the financial assets, and the feeling of wealth. Secondly, this measure is going to affect the sovereignty which stands for independence and disobedience to higher authority, meaning distinctness again. And thirdly, it is going to exclude the Other by putting up barriers and fences in order to of ward off all kinds of differences on all possible levels.
How has the European Union been responding to these threats – firmly, by consolidating its position (the strategy of entrenchment) or meekly, by adaptation? The preservation of the ”soft” approach that has existed thus far is a priority of the multilateral strategy in relation to the traditional power poles within the conventional problem areas. However, the intricate interweaving of domestic and foreign security aspects that tend to blur its outlines in the context of the diffuse threats mentioned above call for a much harder approach.
The thesis of this piece of research is supposed to link the above mentioned threats with a meta-threat that has been trivialized or, to put it differently, turned into normality – meaning populism.
The conceptual framework requires a reassessment of the situation: because although it might look at first sight that the European Union has lost some of its soft power (in its relation to the acquis) as a result of the Brexit referendum, it is the centrifugal populist trends that tend to encourage the consolidation of the community – both internally and externally.
The research methodology has been based on Walter Carlsnaes’ model which takes into consideration the interaction between the structure (as a purely power center category) and subjectivity. When examining the elections held and the Brexit referendum, we have taken into account the rational and the cognitive prerequisites, including the ones expanded by emotional and value premises; we have also taken into consideration the situational and the structural variables (the role of the individual Member States and of the community as a whole), as well as the institutional factors that tend to generate the environment for the above mentioned crisis processes.
The empirical section was built around the challenges facing the British national sovereignty as a result of the Brexit referendum which reflects, as if in a curved mirror, the penal vote for reasons of deficit of democracy in the EU (excessive bureaucracy), as well as the immigration threat – the decay of the imperial idea of the exceptionality of the UK with an attempted, but not so efficient, isolation from the global challenges. Next comes the chronological analysis of the 2017 processes involving the change of power in seven European states which, quite in harmony with the populists’ claims that they are going to overturn the order existing within the domestic political elites and in the European institutions, managed to establish a dynamic status quo that has been maintained by the inertia – in some transition countries, and by consistency – in the countries with well-established institutional culture.
Which are the threats to the integrity of the EU that have been menacing its structural, institutional and legal concurrence – more often than not, as a single whole?
In the first place, this is the financial crisis which has been described as a chronic state of dysfunction of the credit institutions and the banking system as a whole, the divergences in competitiveness, the inertia rather than a drive towards an overall growth, and the over-indebtedness which was symptomatic at an early stage of the presence of “free riders” in the Eurozone that have been discrediting the idea of burden sharing.
Secondly, this is the migration wave that has been intensifying the general concern about the need for solidarity in terms of humanitarian support within the framework of the integration community without being able to prescribe any shared views and, hence – joint action. In addition, the refugee-and-migration crisis has been having some side effects that have been causing disaccord on a government level thus depreciating the sui generis nature of the European Union incorporating state and non-state characteristics. There has been an adverse reaction stemming from the previous risk which involves paranoid episodes of xenophobia materializing in all kinds of outrage against the Different. This intolerance has been further complicated by the terrorist attacks in some large European cities which have further revealed the vulnerability of the integration community to the unconventional risks.
Populism is an intersection of these pathological deviations occurring in the condition of the European Union as it employs an austerity discourse (budget cutting), radicalism (Islamophobia and homophobia) and exceptionalism (independence and self-sufficiency).
In view of the above mentioned threats, how could one impose the emergency measures that are needed for the preservation of the existential values (second generation securitization ) as stipulated by the Copenhagen school? One universal measure involves restriction which, however, is going to affect the structural, the institutional and the legal stability of the integration community. In the first place, it involves budget constraints that are going to affect the banking institutions, the financial assets, and the feeling of wealth. Secondly, this measure is going to affect the sovereignty which stands for independence and disobedience to higher authority, meaning distinctness again. And thirdly, it is going to exclude the Other by putting up barriers and fences in order to of ward off all kinds of differences on all possible levels.
How has the European Union been responding to these threats – firmly, by consolidating its position (the strategy of entrenchment) or meekly, by adaptation? The preservation of the ”soft” approach that has existed thus far is a priority of the multilateral strategy in relation to the traditional power poles within the conventional problem areas. However, the intricate interweaving of domestic and foreign security aspects that tend to blur its outlines in the context of the diffuse threats mentioned above call for a much harder approach.
The thesis of this piece of research is supposed to link the above mentioned threats with a meta-threat that has been trivialized or, to put it differently, turned into normality – meaning populism.
The conceptual framework requires a reassessment of the situation: because although it might look at first sight that the European Union has lost some of its soft power (in its relation to the acquis) as a result of the Brexit referendum, it is the centrifugal populist trends that tend to encourage the consolidation of the community – both internally and externally.
The research methodology has been based on Walter Carlsnaes’ model which takes into consideration the interaction between the structure (as a purely power center category) and subjectivity. When examining the elections held and the Brexit referendum, we have taken into account the rational and the cognitive prerequisites, including the ones expanded by emotional and value premises; we have also taken into consideration the situational and the structural variables (the role of the individual Member States and of the community as a whole), as well as the institutional factors that tend to generate the environment for the above mentioned crisis processes.
The empirical section was built around the challenges facing the British national sovereignty as a result of the Brexit referendum which reflects, as if in a curved mirror, the penal vote for reasons of deficit of democracy in the EU (excessive bureaucracy), as well as the immigration threat – the decay of the imperial idea of the exceptionality of the UK with an attempted, but not so efficient, isolation from the global challenges. Next comes the chronological analysis of the 2017 processes involving the change of power in seven European states which, quite in harmony with the populists’ claims that they are going to overturn the order existing within the domestic political elites and in the European institutions, managed to establish a dynamic status quo that has been maintained by the inertia – in some transition countries, and by consistency – in the countries with well-established institutional culture.
BELOV, M. (ed.). Rule of Law at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century. Eleven International Publishing. The Hague, 2018
The paper takes the vantage point of the English school as a major international relations theory... more The paper takes the vantage point of the English school as a major international relations theory and acknowledges the importance of law and morality besides the institutionalized role of the balance of power in international politics. Rule of law nowadays proves to be one of the founding principles that maintain order in international society. The question of its universality presupposes the inclusion of compliant states and the expansion of a community based on democracy, legitimacy, transparency and accountability, checks and balances, constitutional review, respect for human rights. Thus specific ethical (rule-of-law based) boundaries are drawn in accordance with EU normative power of principles, standards and values, both in the Union's internal and external affairs: (1) between the EU and several Central European states that diverge from basic rule-of-law principles and are therefore prone to moral exclusionary practices; (2) between the EU and some Western Balkans countries whose efforts to meet accession criteria are faltering; (3) between the EU and ex-Soviet states that oscillate back from the EU perspective due to the complex ties with other powerful states.
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