- University College Dublin, Philosophy, Post-DocUniversity of Sussex, Philosophy, Department Memberadd
- Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Ontology, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Aristotle, and 26 morePlato, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Deconstruction, Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, G.W.F. Hegel, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Dialectic, Beer (Alcohol Studies), Affect (Cultural Theory), Affect, Emotion and Feeling, Feminist Theory, Feminist Phenomenology, Existentialism, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Affect/Emotion, Heidegger, Emotion, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Kant & neo-Kantianism, 20th-century German philosophy, Phenomenology of the body, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Emotion, and Transcendental Philosophyedit
- My research interests lie in 20th Century Continental Philosophy, notably in hermeneutic phenomenology and existentialism.edit
- Professor Dermot Moran edit
We live in a world where technology reaches into every aspect of our lives. Technological devices are with us from the minute we wake up until the moment we fall asleep. We trade digital information with a host of individuals at a rate... more
We live in a world where technology reaches into every aspect of our lives. Technological devices are with us from the minute we wake up until the moment we fall asleep. We trade digital information with a host of individuals at a rate that was inconceivable just a generation ago. Despite the impact technology has on our daily life, relatively little philosophical reflection has gone into explaining what draw us into technology’s embrace. Beginning in the mid-30s, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) turned his attention to the framework in which technological devices are understood. His critique of technology is based on the key concept of Gestell, often translated as “enframing” or “positionality”, and it indicates the way we frame, position, and ultimately reduce the world to resources for production and consumption. Gestell refers to our tendency to make everything, including ourselves, a resource ready to be called on in the service of a technological system. According to Heidegger, reducing the world to readily available resources is dangerous because it undermines our creative engagement with reality, alienates us from ourselves and each other, and leads to the destruction of our habitat. In this talk, I will focus on the ways Heidegger’s critique of technology is not really a critique of technological apparatuses and machines, but rather a critique of the ways techno-science represents the world in a reductive manner. I will hence focus on techno-science as a mode of revealing nature that needs to be overcome.
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A short, informal interview/coversation about philosophy. The target audience is non-philosophers who don't know much about philosophy. I hope it helps. (In Cypriot dialect, with English subtitles).
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An informal talk I gave at Sussex University, 12.7.13. Work-in-Progress series. Approx. 1:15 minutes plus 20 mins Q&A. Title: "Motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life: Husserl between Pfänder and Heidegger". You are... more
An informal talk I gave at Sussex University, 12.7.13. Work-in-Progress series. Approx. 1:15 minutes plus 20 mins Q&A. Title: "Motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life: Husserl between Pfänder and Heidegger".
You are very welcome to listen to it and send me feedback. This is work in progress and thus some of the arguments not fully worked out yet. I would appreciate any kind of constructive feedback. (The title might be a bit misleading; it's mostly on Heidegger, but the point was to show a continuity with Husserl and indirectly with Pfaender on certain issues. It will be further developed into something bigger that extends into more essential arguments that were not made here, due to time constraints).
LINK: https://www.dropbox.com/s/h0uu19mcsa63nt5/Christos%2020130712%20140713.mp3
You are very welcome to listen to it and send me feedback. This is work in progress and thus some of the arguments not fully worked out yet. I would appreciate any kind of constructive feedback. (The title might be a bit misleading; it's mostly on Heidegger, but the point was to show a continuity with Husserl and indirectly with Pfaender on certain issues. It will be further developed into something bigger that extends into more essential arguments that were not made here, due to time constraints).
LINK: https://www.dropbox.com/s/h0uu19mcsa63nt5/Christos%2020130712%20140713.mp3
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I read To Be Born as a book on ontology. It is a book about what it means to be, what it means to become who one already is. To Be Born delivers an ontological project that Luce Irigaray announces in earlier books. Irigaray's work offers... more
I read To Be Born as a book on ontology. It is a book about what it means to be, what it means to become who one already is. To Be Born delivers an ontological project that Luce Irigaray announces in earlier books. Irigaray's work offers an original and positive conception of human existence and the way to fulfil its destiny, in the sense that it posits a determinate way of looking at human being. Irigaray's ontology is independent—its noematic economy being self-sufficient—but it also constitutes a criticism of major figures of the Western metaphysical canon, notably Plato Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Insofar as she calls for a new beginning, a historical rupture from metaphysics, her work can also be understood as a dialogue with the major thinkers of the western canon she wishes to overcome. Amongst these dialogues, her dialogue with Heidegger is, in my opinion, the most intriguing.
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Workshop on Heidegger on Technology
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In this seminar I go through Heidegger's objections to Anthropology and try to contextualize it, explain it, and critically evaluate it. Introductory level.
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Postgraduate seminar on Husserl's life-world and Heidegger's Worldhood (in BT)
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In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that disposition is one of the ways through which “Being-there” [Da-Sein] is constituted. Disposition, through moods, reveal “Being-in-the-World” as a whole, as well as enable intentional directedness.... more
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that disposition is one of the ways through which “Being-there” [Da-Sein] is constituted. Disposition, through moods, reveal “Being-in-the-World” as a whole, as well as enable intentional directedness. Moods also disclose facticity as the burdensome character of Da-Sein. In this context, Heidegger sometimes appears to take an essentialist position whereby disposition is a way of relating to facticity, which is something like a “state-of-affairs” that essentially a burden, difficult, painful, and threatening. Dasein's normal moods avoid this burden, and this must be reversed. Thus, it seems unavoidable that Heidegger must turn to an analysis of fear and Angst. In this talk, I will identify certain problems with this interpretation and try to resolve them by paying attention to the twofold meaning of burden, as well as a deeper analysis of the notion of facticity.
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Updated Conference Programme
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Conference Programme
Research Interests: Philosophy, Aesthetics, Existential Phenomenological Psychotherapy, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and 10 moreContinental Philosophy, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Martin Heidegger, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Affect Theory, Affect/Emotion, Affect (Cultural Theory), Existentialism, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, and Continental Philosophy and Aesthetics
Research Interests: Gender Studies, Philosophy, Feminist Theory, Philosophical Theology, Existential Phenomenological Psychotherapy, and 19 moreFeminist Philosophy, Deconstruction, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Feminism, Levinas, Phenomenology of the body, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Immanuel Kant, Heidegger, Jan Patocka, Phenomenology of Space and Place, Merleau-Ponty, Queer Phenomenology, and Existentialism
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The past two years have been eventful for Heidegger scholarship. Heidegger’s Black Notebooks from the 1930s were published (GA94–96), exposing his antisemitism in a new way, and reigniting several debates. The question that mattered most... more
The past two years have been eventful for Heidegger scholarship. Heidegger’s Black Notebooks from the 1930s were published (GA94–96), exposing his antisemitism in a new way, and reigniting several debates. The question that mattered most was whether his philosophy – rather than the person – was inherently antisemitic. If yes: should we continue reading and teaching Heidegger in the twenty-first century?
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Towards a New Human Being gathers original essays by early career researchers and established academic figures in response to To Be Born, Luce Irigaray's most recent book. The contributors approach key issues of this book from their own... more
Towards a New Human Being gathers original essays by early career researchers and established academic figures in response to To Be Born, Luce Irigaray's most recent book. The contributors approach key issues of this book from their own scientific fields and perspectives – through calls for a different way of bringing up and educating children, the constitution of a new environmental and sociocultural milieu or the criticism of past metaphysics and the introduction of new themes into the philosophical horizon. However, all the essays which compose the volume correspond to proposals for the advent of a new human being – so answering the subtitle of To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being. To Be Born thus acts as a background from which each author had the opportunity to develop and think in their own way. As such Towards a New Human Being is part of a longer-term undertaking in which Irigaray engaged together and in dialogue with more or less confirmed thinkers with a view to giving birth to a new human being and building a new world.
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I argue that while Being and Time continues Husserl’s modernist project that aims to ground ontological knowledge in phenomenological evidence, Heidegger radicalizes the basic concept of “evidence” operative in Husserlian phenomenology.... more
I argue that while Being and Time continues Husserl’s modernist project that aims to ground ontological knowledge in phenomenological evidence, Heidegger radicalizes the basic concept of “evidence” operative in Husserlian phenomenology.
For Husserl, it is originary intuition that serves as apodictically certain evidence. Husserl’s position is akin to mentalist evidentialism, complying with its basic tenets, namely that justification is determined by the quality of the believer’s evidence, and that evidence is internal to the person’s mental life (in other words: evidence consists in mental states).
Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology precisely on account of the fact that it was guided by an empty and fantastic idea of certainty and evidence. In Being and Time, it is Angst that plays the crucial methodological function of evidence upon which the ontological knowledge gained by the existential analytic of Dasein is grounded. Heidegger repeatedly juxtaposes the kind of evidence supplied by Angst with the kind of evidence supplied by the apodictic certainty of originary intuition. This makes Heidegger’s own epistemic principles incompatible with Husserl’s. While Heidegger remains committed to a sort of quasi-evidentialism, his position is fundamentally incompatible with Husserl’s mentalist evidentialism: Angst cannot be reduced to an internal condition, and it cannot be reduced to a mental state either. What is more, it is precisely through fundamental moods, such as Angst, that Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time indicates a phenomenon that overcomes the internal-external dualism, and also overcomes the mentalism characteristic of Husserl’s phenomenology.
For Husserl, it is originary intuition that serves as apodictically certain evidence. Husserl’s position is akin to mentalist evidentialism, complying with its basic tenets, namely that justification is determined by the quality of the believer’s evidence, and that evidence is internal to the person’s mental life (in other words: evidence consists in mental states).
Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology precisely on account of the fact that it was guided by an empty and fantastic idea of certainty and evidence. In Being and Time, it is Angst that plays the crucial methodological function of evidence upon which the ontological knowledge gained by the existential analytic of Dasein is grounded. Heidegger repeatedly juxtaposes the kind of evidence supplied by Angst with the kind of evidence supplied by the apodictic certainty of originary intuition. This makes Heidegger’s own epistemic principles incompatible with Husserl’s. While Heidegger remains committed to a sort of quasi-evidentialism, his position is fundamentally incompatible with Husserl’s mentalist evidentialism: Angst cannot be reduced to an internal condition, and it cannot be reduced to a mental state either. What is more, it is precisely through fundamental moods, such as Angst, that Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time indicates a phenomenon that overcomes the internal-external dualism, and also overcomes the mentalism characteristic of Husserl’s phenomenology.
